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Antti Kasvio
What Information Society?
A vision and its realisation
During the early 1990s many leading politicians in advanced 
industrial countries became thrilled by visions of a new 
information technology revolution and its possible societal 
consequences. Already during the 1980s there had been a lot of 
talk about the so-called microprocessor revolution and personal 
computers had spread quickly, both within the workplace and 
among households. More advanced generations of computers 
and software continued to enter the market with what seemed 
to be accelerating speed. At the same time, people had begun 
to talk about new kinds of information superhighways, and 
the popularity of the world wide web was exploding. A new 
communications revolution seemed to be in the making, and 
it would evidently have a signiﬁ cant impact upon the everyday 
lives of citizens. Th is revolution also seemed to provide the 
advanced industrial countries with an opportunity to restore their 
competitiveness and to generate new economic growth at a time 
when they were on the defensive in many traditional sectors. 
Articles in Wired magazine and books like Bill Gates’ Th e Road 
Ahead (1995), Nicholas Negroponte’s Being Digital (1995) and 
Frances Cairncross’ Death of Distance (1997) were eﬀ ectively 
spreading the message of this new revolution.
Originally, the signiﬁ cance of this new revolution was 
invented by a few innovation economists. For instance, Chris 
Freeman and Luc Soete saw that digital signal processing had 
developed into a common platform for a wide range of diﬀ erent 
applications, and this observation led them to write about a 
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major technological breakthrough that would lead towards the 
development of a whole new technological paradigm (Freeman 
& Soete 1994). Terms like ‘digital revolution’, ‘new information 
and communication technology’ and ‘media convergence’ soon 
became widely used in diﬀ erent contexts. From the outset it 
was considered evident that the main economic beneﬁ ts of the 
new ICTs would not be gained in the production of diﬀ erent 
information technological devices but rather in the development 
of new software and applications for these technologies.
One could already see the political signiﬁ cance of this new 
revolution in the 1992 presidential elections in the United States 
when both the Democratic and Republican candidates invited 
technology visionaries into their campaign teams. A little later 
the so-called National Information Infrastructure initiative 
became a central part of the Clinton-Gore governmental agenda 
(Clinton & Gore 1992, 10). In western Europe the building of 
new information highways was included as an important element 
of the growth strategy formulated in the EU Commission White 
Paper on growth, competitiveness and employment that was 
published in December 1993 (EU Commission 1993). Soon 
thereafter, advanced industrial countries started a large number 
of programmes and initiatives in order to promote the spread 
and use of new information and communication technologies. In 
addition, the G7 group of advanced industrial countries launched 
its own action plan in order to promote the development of 
information society on a worldwide scale (G7 Summit 1994). 
Th e term ‘information society’ became widely used, particularly 
in the various policy documents published by the European 
Union (EU Commission 1994). With this terminological choice 
the European authorities wanted to stress the overall character 
of those changes that would take place as a consequence of the 
information technology revolution, whereas more technological 
621
VII Future Directions
Antti Kasvio
terms – like ‘information highway’ – were preferred in North 
American discussions.
Th e visions of a new industrial revolution gained more 
credibility with the emergence of a new generation of so-called 
dotcom enterprises, some of which were able to reach amazing 
rates of growth. It was not long before people began talking about 
a new economy that would transform the advanced industrial 
economies. In the space of a few years the new economy evolved 
from a small number of pioneering enterprises into the main 
engine of the U.S. national economy. Corporations and private 
households alike were able to multiply their property by investing 
in technology stocks that were growing at an unprecedented 
speed. Th e pace of change was much more modest in western 
Europe and Japan, but determined eﬀ orts were made in both 
these societies to narrow the gap that had emerged between 
them and the United States. One can, thus, very well say that, 
during the 1990s, information society became the grand societal 
project of advanced industrial countries in the same way that 
the building of a modern welfare state had dominated their 
social and economic policies after the Second World War. Even 
if the new information and communication technologies seemed 
– particularly in the initial stages of their adoption – to be mainly 
concentrated in the advanced industrial countries, it was expected 
that they would soon be spreading all over the world. Th us, with 
the right policies it would become possible to narrow the global 
digital divides, at least to some extent.
Developments in social science
Academic social science did not necessarily share the enthusiasm 
that many other actors had for the idea of ‘information society’ 
as a new type of society that would emerge from the information 
technology revolution. Social scientists have traditionally been 
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rather sceptical about talk of major societal changes being 
caused by technological revolutions. Th ey have wanted to avoid 
being caught in the trap of technological determinism, and 
have wanted to make a clear distinction between real societal 
change processes and rhetorical declarations about changes that 
are only expected to occur. Th e concept of information society 
was originally introduced into social scientiﬁ c discussion by 
futurological authors during the late 1970s and early 1980s, but 
it did not have any clear theoretical status. Th us, until the mid-
1990s, most social scientiﬁ c commentaries of the information 
society discourse were quite critical towards these ideas (see 
e.g. Webster 1995; Kumar 1995; Duﬀ  2000), and much more 
attention was paid to other change processes going on within 
the advanced industrial societies. Th ere were lively discussions 
about the post-Fordist restructuring of production, changes in 
the existing welfare state regimes, new trends in gender identities, 
and cultural postmodernism, for example. Gradually, however, 
the spread of new informaton and communication technologies 
had reached dimensions that prompted some social scientists to 
think that perhaps something important was indeed happening. 
Th e ‘Information Age’ trilogy published by Manuel 
Castells in 1996–97 transformed the intellectual landscape of 
modern social science. In this book Castells presents a carefully 
articulated and complex analysis of the ‘informational’ stage of 
modern capitalism (Castells 1996–7).  Th e key message of this 
book is that the advanced industrial societies are indeed entering 
a qualitatively new stage in their historical development and that 
these changes are driven by gobalisation and technical change. 
Th e changes could be seen within the economy, with globally 
networked enterprises as key actors, in the world of work, in the 
spatial organisation of modern societies, in the area of culture, 
in politics, in the role of the state and in the ways in which 
people are building their personal identities. Anthony Giddens 
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immediately hailed the book as a modern classic (Giddens 
1996) and, since its appearance, several social scientists have 
started to systematically study the role of new information and 
communication technologies in the functioning of modern 
societies.
As a societal change project, information society reached 
its climax at the end of the 1990s. By that time it had become 
evident that the growth of the new economy had signiﬁ cantly 
contributed to the exceptionally long boom and rapid expansion 
of the stock markets in the United States. All enterprises wanted to 
reinvent themselves to be seen as real information-age companies. 
If clear evidence of the productivity-increasing eﬀ ects of ICTs had 
previously been diﬃ  cult to ﬁ nd, towards the end of the decade 
a clear upward trend became visible in the national economic 
statistics. It seemed that the advanced industrial economies might 
be approaching a new era of sustained, high economic growth 
and increasing aﬄ  uence, and that perhaps the traditional boom-
bust cycles would also be passing into history. Politically, the 
world seemed to be moving towards liberal democracy, a process 
that was supported by the free ﬂ ow of information within the 
worldwide electronic networks. It was expected that the world 
would perhaps also learn to solve international conﬂ icts in a more 
coordinated manner so that classic wars between nation-states 
could be avoided. And it was thought that the development of 
modern natural science would open up new possibilities to cure 
illnesses and provide citizens with the opportunity to live longer 
and happier lives (see e.g. Schwartz & Leyden 1997).
Facing new realities
Th e entire economic and political landscape in advanced 
industrial countries changed dramatically during the ﬁ rst years 
of the 21st century. Certain promises connected to the new 
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information and communication technologies were not fulﬁ lled, 
the ﬁ nancial bubble built around technology stocks burst and 
the world economy glided into a new recession. Th e advanced 
industrial economies have since recovered from the recession, but 
their economic growth has been based on very traditional factors, 
in particular on the consumption behaviour of U.S. households. 
ICT companies have been forced to adjust their activities to the 
same limitations as the more traditional companies, and the 
term ‘new economy’ has virtually disappeared from economic 
literature. 
Almost equally strong changes have taken place in the area of 
politics. Th e earlier democratic trends have given way to the rise 
of new authoritarian regimes in several countries in various parts 
of the world. Th e United States has strengthened its position 
as the world’s leading economic and military power and has 
shown its readiness to unilaterally use force in promoting its own 
national interests. Tensions between western countries and radical 
Islamism have become aggravated, especially after the Al Qaeda 
terrorist attack in September 2001, and, instead of creating 
mutual undestanding, the worldwide spread of information may 
be oﬀ ering people further reasons to disagree with each other 
(Kaplan 2002, 5–6). New power struggles have emerged between 
countries over the control of the world’s critical energy resources. 
Conservative forces are creating new barriers in the development 
of science, and many people have doubts about whether the 
potential of science and technology is really used for the beneﬁ t 
of mankind. Th e prevailing patterns of growth are connected with 
serious ecological risks, but there is little potential for ﬁ nding real 
solutions.
Th ese changes in conditions have led to certain reassessments 
in social science as well. It has been asked whether social 
scientists were also carried away by the hyped expectations that 
led so many investors and policymakers astray during the 1990s. 
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Rather sharp criticisms have been presented, for instance with 
regard to the ‘phantasmagories’ of Manuel Castells (Heise 2002). 
Frank Webster – the British sociologist who during the 1990s 
wrote the most authoritative review of the existing information 
society theories – has posed the question of whether we can really 
interpret certain quantitative trends as leading towards qualitative 
changes in the basic institutional arrangements of modern 
societies. His own stand is hesitant and he believes that it is up 
to us to decide whether we want to use the term ‘information 
society’ to describe the current stage in the development of 
modern societies (Webster 2002, 267). 
At the same, Webster makes an important qualiﬁ cation. 
While the term ‘information society’ has been used to refer both 
to the spread and use of new information and communication 
technologies and to the growing knowledge-intensity of our 
activities, Webster suggests that the increasing signiﬁ cance of 
abstract theoretical knowledge is the more important trend. 
In this respect we can talk about ‘information societies’ and 
‘knowledge societies’ as synonyms, and the new information and 
communication technologies gain importance as technologies 
that signiﬁ cantly increase our knowledge-processing capacities. 
Th is solution brings Webster closer to the thinking of such 
authors as Daniel Bell (1973), Peter F. Drucker (1969) and Nico 
Stehr (1994) and those neoinstitutional theorists of economic 
growth who, during the 1990s, developed their ideas about 
knowledge-based economy (Webster 2002a, 263–273; see also 
Webster 2002b).
Manuel Castells’ new theoretical position
Manuel Castells has also developed his ideas further (Castells 
2004), but he has been moving in an entirely diﬀ erent direction. 
During 1996–97 Castells gave his trilogy a title ‘Information 
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Age’ and, although he preferred to talk about an ‘informational 
society’, he did not actually reject being identiﬁ ed as a theorist 
of information society (see Castells 1996, 21). More recently, 
however, he has wanted to distance himself clearly from the 
earlier ideas of information or knowledge society. According to 
Castells, any attempt to analyse modern societies in these terms 
is ‘an empirical and theoretical error’ (Castells 2004, 7). Th e 
main reason for this is that information and knowledge have 
always been key factors in achieving power and wealth in all 
societies. Castells adds that ‘in broader terms of social evolution, 
the notion of the information society reproduces the myth of 
the historical continuum from nomadic to agricultural societies, 
then to industrial society, to culminate in the apogee, obviously 
in our time, of the information society. Human history is then 
assimilated to the long march of progress under the guidance of 
reason (with occasional prayers to God just in case), as exempliﬁ ed 
by the wonders of computers, clean toilets, and smart weapons. 
No conﬂ ict, no contradiction, just technologically predetermined 
change, and resistance to change. And since resistance to reason is 
irrational, it must be obliterated to clear the shining path toward 
our promised star’ (op.cit., 40).
Evidently Castells wants to distinguish himself from the 
abstract universal historical theoretisations according to which 
all societies would be moving from agricultural to industrial and 
from industrial to information society as a unilinear process driven 
by the objective laws of scientiﬁ c, technical and human progress. 
But this does not mean that Castells would have abolished the 
idea of analysing technology as the key moving force of societal 
development. Neither does it mean that he would have lost his 
belief in the signiﬁ cance of the ongoing information technology 
revolution. On the contrary, his main thesis is that modern 
societies have entered into a new type of society, the network 
society, and that this development has become possible because of 
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the development of electronic information and communication 
technologies (Castells 2004, 6). Indeed, he writes that ‘on the 
basis of a new technological paradigm (informationalism) a new 
social structure has emerged, a structure made up of electronic 
communication technologies – powered, social networks. . . . 
Th erefore, in my view, we must let the notion of an information 
society or of a knowledge society wither, and replace it with the 
concept of network society’ (Castells 2004, 41).
Castells deﬁ nes the network society as ‘a society whose 
structure is made of networks powered by microelectronics-based 
information and communication technologies’. A network is 
‘a set of interconnected nodes’. Networks have no centres, only 
nodes which may be of varying relevance for the network. All 
nodes are not necessary for the network’s performance, and when 
nodes ‘become redundant or useless, networks tend to reconﬁ gure 
themselves, deleting some nodes, and adding new ones. Nodes 
only exist and function as components of networks. Th e network 
is the unit, not the node’ (Castells 2004, 3). Th e existence of 
networks is not a new phenomenon; in fact, in line with authors 
like Fritjof Capra (2002) or Mark C. Taylor (2001), Castells 
ﬁ nds that networks ‘constitute the fundamental pattern of life, of 
all kinds of life’ (op.cit., 4). He cites those who point out that 
networks have had a signiﬁ cant role even in ancient societies. Th e 
superiority of networks is based mainly upon their high levels 
of ﬂ exibility, scalability and survivability (5–6). However, the 
victory of networks over vertical-hierarchical organisations has 
actually become substantiated together with the development 
of modern information and communication technologies. Th e 
main reason for this is that the network form of organisation has 
always had certain material limits to overcome, and these limits 
have essentially been linked to the technologies that have been 
available at that time (5).
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If we compare these statements to the comments that Castells 
presented in 1996 about the concept of network society, we can 
see a clear shift of emphasis. Even if he already then preferred 
the term ‘network society’ as the most adequate description of 
the character of modern societies, he pointed out that certain 
components – ‘such as social movements or the state’ – exhibit 
features that go beyond the networking logic and, therefore, 
that this term does not necessarily exhaust all the meaning of 
the informational society (Castells 1996, 21). More recently, 
Castells has taken the position that the network metaphor can 
be used to analyse and to explain all the key processes going on 
within modern societies, ranging from the competitive strategies 
of modern enterprises to the ‘swarming’ tactics of modern 
high-technology warfare, the functioning of the media and the 
operational logic of diﬀ erent kinds of social movements.
Despite these kinds of reconceptualisations, most of the 
actual substance of Castells’ description of the modern network 
society – including his analysis of ‘informationalism’ as a new 
technological paradigm, the rise of the network enterprise, 
the increasing signiﬁ cance of the media, the development of 
new power structures, processes of spatial restructuring and 
the emergence of new timeless time – can be regarded as a 
recapitulation of those theses that Castells has already presented 
in his earlier writings. We can, however, see that Castells makes 
a special eﬀ ort to avoid potential accusations of technological 
determinism. He emphasises the contingent character of the 
information technology revolution, which has been an outcome 
of quite speciﬁ c historical conditions (Castells 2004, 14–22), and 
he also stressess that the resulting social structures ‘always express, 
in a contradictory and conﬂ ictive pattern, the interests, values, 
and projects of the actors who produce the structure while being 
conditioned by it’ (24). Th ese kinds of speciﬁ cations cannot be 
found in the standard visions of unilateral information society.
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Another important element in Castells’ analysis is the 
active search for counter-trends to those ways in which the 
global network society is currently developing. He postulates 
that the processes of market liberalisation that led to the post-
Fordist restructuring of production in the late 1970s and early 
1980s would have had some real alternatives (16–17). He also 
points out that the question of what constitutes value in modern 
network societies is basically still open. Even if, according to 
the logic of capital accumulation, money is the measure of 
everything, with a diﬀ erent frame ‘ideas, or speciﬁ c sets of ideas, 
could assert themselves as the truly supreme value (such as 
preserving our planet, our species)’ (25). In a more pronounced 
manner, Castells thematises the issues of resistance in his analysis 
of power and counter-power within the network society (34–36) 
and he evidently has certain expectations about the emancipatory 
powers of grassrooting which, ‘instead of enclosing meaning 
and functions in the programs of the networks’, could ‘provide 
material support for the global connection of local experience’ 
(38). In his cultural analysis Castells sketches an opposition 
between ‘the diﬀ usion of the capitalist mind through the power 
excercised in global networks’ and a process by which ‘conscious 
social actors of multiple origins bring to others their resources 
and beliefs, expecting in return to receive the same, and even 
more: sharing a diverse world, and thus ending the ancestral fear 
of the other’ (40).
Critical refl ections
Altogether Castells has presented a very bold theoretical thesis 
which is undoubtedly interesting but at the same time also highly 
problematic. For instance, the way in which Castells criticises 
theories of information or knowledge society is not very coherent 
with regard to those arguments which he presents in favour of his 
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own network society concept. He writes that it is not sensible to 
talk about a transition to information society because all societies 
are based upon information. Th is is undoubtedly true in the 
sense that a society cannot exist without at least some kind of 
common consciousness. But what has actually been presented in 
recent discussions is that there has been a qualitative shift in the 
knowledge-producing capacity of modern societies, and therefore 
all their activities have become much more knowledge-intensive 
than ever before. Castells writes that the most important new 
feature of modern societies is their increasing reliance upon 
networks. At the same time, Castells postulates in another passus 
that all historical societies have been based on networks and 
that, in general, there cannot be life without networks. Why is 
postulating A a logical error while postulating B on the same 
grounds is not?
It is also worthwhile to ask to what extent Castells has been 
able to avoid the trap of technological determinism. Although 
he stresses the historically and culturally contingent character 
of technological innovation processes, he seems to have a very 
strong evolutionary vision about modern societies transforming 
into increasingly complex adaptive systems. Th is rather 
straightforward vision leads Castells to say that the structures of 
modern societies are based upon or powered by the new electronic 
information and communication technologies. Such a thesis can 
be criticised by pointing out that social structures tend to emerge 
through complex historical processes in which technological 
factors may play a certain role, but one that should not be 
exaggerated. Similar criticisms can be presented concerning the 
author’s willingness to apply the network metaphor to everything 
that happens in modern societies. Doesn’t this manifest a fairly 
deterministic stance? It assumes that the various institutions 
do not have any other choice than to start functioning in a 
networking mode because it is technically most eﬀ ective. In order 
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to satisfy that requirement, they must base their activities upon 
new information and communication technologies.
From a cognitive perspective, perhaps the most crucial 
question is: what do we actually get from the thesis which says 
that in modern societies everything happens through networking? 
Networks do indeed function under diﬀ erent rules than 
centralised bureaucracies. But the network metaphor is a very 
general one, and the more widely we use it, the less it can tell us 
about the speciﬁ c features of particular institutions or processes. 
Let us take for instance the functioning of modern economic 
institutions. We can postulate a thesis according to which we 
are moving towards a global network economy. But what does it 
actually mean? Modern economies are undoubtedly functioning 
as complex networks in which single nodes are organised as 
private enterprises that interact with each other through markets. 
Th e markets have developed into a complex, decentralised and 
self-programming system which relies upon the price mechanism. 
We have a wide body of economic literature that attempts to 
analyse this system’s functioning. Adding the label ‘network’ 
to these analyses or interpreting the economy’s functioning 
according to the networking logic does not, in itself, increase our 
understanding about economic phenomena unless this process 
leads to some substantially new hypotheses or observations about 
today’s economic phenomena.
One interesting feature of Castells’ analysis is that he does 
not discuss extensively those qualitatively new trends that have 
been observed after the burst of the ﬁ nancial bubble and the 
declaration of war against terrorism. In his perspective the most 
important developments seem to have taken place during the 
1990s, with its excesses having simply been a temporary deviation 
caused by ‘the fantasies of business consultants and futurologists 
who forgot that the key role of the Internet is to power the real 
economy’ (42). Nothing seems to have shaken Castell’s reliance 
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upon ‘informationalism’ as a new technological paradigm that 
will one day transform the whole world. 
Th is means that despite Manuel Castell’s enormous 
achievements in modern social science his analysis does not 
necessarily serve, any longer, as such an adequate and up-to-date 
‘analysis of the present’ as the Information Age trilogy did when 
it ﬁ rst came out. Castells does not necessarily touch upon those 
questions that many people consider most troubling or politically 
relevant at the current stage of societal development. Instead, 
the continuation of some old themes is complemented in his 
newer writings with very broad civilisatory reﬂ ections, a number 
of more or less hitting commentaries about concrete issues and 
elements of social criticism that are interesting in their own right 
but do not necessarily present a real challenge to the present 
course of aﬀ airs.
Is the information society project still alive?
It is quite evident that building the information society is 
no longer a particularly hot topic in the advanced industrial 
countries. Oﬃ  cially, the European Union is still ﬁ rmly committed 
to promoting the development of information society and a new 
world summit has convened in order to discuss this issue (ITU 
2004), but leading politicians are not trying to increase their 
support by presenting themselves as the real pioneers of the 
information age. For example, if one tries to ﬁ nd out what was 
said about the topics of ‘information society’ or ‘new economy’ 
in the autumn 2004 US presidential debates, the search engine 
responds politely that ‘we’re sorry, your search did not ﬁ nd any 
matches’ (Commission on Presidential Debates 2004). One 
consequence of this is that not very many heads of state did 
actually participate in the Tunis World Summit in November 
2005.
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Th e main reason for such a change in atmosphere is that 
the political actors have a number of more relevant issues to deal 
with. Among these are the questions of economic growth and 
employment in advanced industrial countries at a time when 
many companies are relocationg their operations to China and 
India. Populations are aging, and the existing systems of taxation 
and social security need to be reformed. Th ere are serious security 
issues to tackle, the war on terrorism is continuing, and energy 
prices are increasing. Of course, the information technology 
revolution is still seen as an important issue, the ICT industry is 
recognised as a very central cluster and the new information and 
communication technologies can be used to boost productivity 
within the public sector. On the other hand, IT investments 
have gone down, some applications have led to disappointments, 
many people are still angry about having lost money after 
investing in technology stocks, and people no longer believe that 
the information technology revolution will lead to prosperity just 
around the corner. Politicians do not necessarily want to invest 
too much of their energy in processes that are going on anyway 
or in raising issues that do not bring them new voters.
At the same time we can see that in academic social science 
the previous, somewhat coherent information society discourse 
has become much more fragmented. Some academics refuse 
to talk about the western countries being in the midst of some 
kind of an epochal transformation; according to them, postulates 
about such fundamental changes have, for the most part, been 
little more than a myth (see e.g. Salvaggio 1989; Garnham 
2002). Others are readier to consider the possibility that such 
a transformation is really taking place, but they are not able 
to reach an agreement about its key driving forces or about 
those terms with which the new society ought to be described. 
Th ere is a strand of research that is mainly interested in the 
societal consequences of new information and communication 
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technologies, with Manuel Castells as one of the leading ﬁ gures, 
but there is also another group of authors – including Frank 
Webster – who stress the signiﬁ cance of knowledge as the most 
important factor of societal change. One consequence of this 
development is that the word ‘knowledge society’ is nowadays 
increasingly used to replace the earlier, almost universally used 
term ‘information society’. Instead of one information society 
discourse we now have two fairly diﬀ erent theoretical research 
programmes, even if these programmes share certain common 
areas of interest.
The current stage of the information 
technology revolution
Before rushing to further conclusions about the present 
theoretical situation, it is useful to analyse the way in which the 
information technology revolution itself is currently proceeding. 
Th e pessimists tend to say that the really radical breakthroughs 
– like the invention of microprocessors, the development of 
personal computers, the introduction of mobile telephony 
and the Internet – have already happened, that many of the 
key technologies are  maturing, and that the miniaturisation of 
processors as well as the increase in their computing powers are 
gradually approaching physical limits which cannot be overcome 
without adopting entirely diﬀ erent technologies. Th us, future 
developments will be mainly incremental in character and the 
most essential of their societal consequences will have already 
been experienced. We have already been able to see, for instance, 
that increasing Internet usage has not in any signiﬁ cant way 
transformed the ways in which organisations function. Neither 
has it led to any fundamental changes in the ways in which 
citizens conduct their everyday lives.
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A certain degree of modesty is undoubtedly welcome after 
all those hyped predictions of the late 1990s. However, it is 
also important to pay attention to the fact that despite certain 
negative trends – like the declining levels of IT investments in 
some countries – the information technology revolution is still 
continuing and certain technologies are spreading worldwide 
even more rapidly than could be expected a few years ago. Th e 
most spectacular phenomenon has undoubtedly been the pace at 
which mobile telephones have been taken into use in all parts of 
the world. It is nowadays estimated that the number of mobile 
phone users would increase to two billion by 2006 or 2007. Th is 
process has taken place relatively soon after television became 
a worldwide media. As a consequence of these developments, 
an essential part of the world population has entirely new 
possibilities to keep themselves informed about what is going on 
elsewhere and to connect with other people. 
At the same time, the use of new information and 
comunication technologies has become an organic part of people’s 
everyday activities within the advanced industrial societies. 
Gradually the emphasis is moving towards more advanced 
solutions, as can be seen for instance in the fast spread of 
broadband connections, the introduction of the next generation 
mobile phones, the development of new enterprise solutions and 
in an increasing number of ‘hotspots’ that are oﬀ ering people in 
those locations the possibility to connect to wireless broadband 
networks. Th ese developments are being driven forward by a 
fast deﬂ ation of the prices of diﬀ erent kinds of information 
technologival devices. Meanwhile, the properties of these devices 
are also improving from one generation to the next.
One consequence of these kinds of developments has been 
the observation that ICT has not lost its signiﬁ cance as an 
important and dynamic force of growth in advanced industrial 
economies. Recent studies have, as a matter of fact, rather 
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convincingly demonstrated that the advanced industrial countries 
can perhaps best improve their productivity and strengthen the 
overall competitiveness of their economies by increasing their 
investments to ICT and by oﬀ ering good growth possibilities 
for the ICT industry (see e.g. Jorgenson 2004; EU Commission 
2004, 155–188; Estevão 2004; PricewaterhouseCoopers 2004).
If we look a little further into the future we can see that, 
despite more sceptical expectations, the processing power of 
integrated circuits is increasing roughly according to Moore’s 
law, which will probably continue for at least some time into 
the future. We will, therefore, relatively soon be approaching 
a situation in which increasingly intelligent applications are 
embedded into our everyday surroundings, enabling us to use 
a broad variety of services in a very natural manner without 
having to sit at a computer or switch on other electronic devices. 
We will also learn to take for granted the possibility to connect 
into diﬀ erent networks wherever we happen to be, whatever 
we are doing. We are not necessarily so interested in which 
speciﬁ c technologies are used in order to establish the required 
connections; our main attention will be directed to those 
substantial activities in which we are using these possibilities.
Various terms have been introduced in recent times to 
analyse these kinds of prospects. For instance, the advisory group 
of the EU IST programme has been using the term ‘ambient 
intelligence’ (see e.g. Ducatel et al. 2001), whereas the term 
‘ubiquitous computing’ has been more widely used in the United 
States, in Japan and in South Korea. Th e main message of the 
diﬀ erent scenarios is, however, basically the same. It is assumed 
that the increasing computing powers that are surrounding us 
will signiﬁ cantly transform the ways in which we conduct our 
everyday activities. Soon we may also be approaching a stage in 
which the information processing powers of modern computers 
will equal that of the human brain (Kurzweil 1999).
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From information to knowledge society
On the basis of these kinds of observations we can conclude 
that the story of the information technology revolution is far 
from being over. It is important to pay attention to the fact that 
the increasing information processing capacities made possible 
by modern computers has also opened the gates to many other 
scientiﬁ c and technological breakthroughs, among which the 
mapping out of the human genome has undoubtedly been one of 
the most important. We can add to this the recent advances that 
have been made in areas such as biotechnology, new materials, 
nanotechnology, and others.
Th is brings us rather naturally to the next conclusion. 
Th e development of new information and communication 
technologies has been important simply because these 
technologies have oﬀ ered us the possibility of handling increasing 
amounts of information. For instance, the rapid worldwide spread 
of mobile telephones is, in itself, a very important phenomenon, 
but the purchase of a mobile phone is also merely the ﬁ rst step in 
the transition into a new information age. Much more important 
change processes will be launched when people living in widely 
diﬀ erent cultures and physical environments start using these 
devices in order to solve all kinds of problems they face in their 
everyday lives. Th is will certainly lead to many kinds of social 
innovations which will have many kinds of consequences for the 
future development of our societies.
Some economists have emphasised the crucial signiﬁ cance 
of ideas in the development of modern economies (see e.g. Jones 
2004). During the early 1990s the representatives of the so-
called new growth theory were able to convincingly show how 
the advanced industrial societies have been moving towards 
increasingly knowledge-intensive patterns of growth (e.g. OECD 
1996). In the mid-1990s this discourse receded somewhat to the 
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background as the attention of many economists was focused 
on analysing the so-called new economy and the interrelations 
between ICT investments and productivity growth. Now it has 
become possible to rehabilitate the idea that the production of 
knowledge is probably the most crucial factor behind future 
productivity increases. We can also see that there are no absolute 
limits to those productivity increases that can be attained 
through better knowledge. In this respect we are only at the 
very beginning of the actual productivity revolution that will, in 
future, proceed on a worldwide scale. Th e traditional knowledge 
institutions – that is the educational and scientiﬁ c institutions 
– will probably have an important role in this transformation 
(e.g. Roco & Bainbridge 2004; Garreau 2004)
Th is brings us back to the demarcation that has in recent 
discussions emerged between the diﬀ erent kinds of information 
society discourses: those stressing the signiﬁ cance of the 
information technology revolution and those looking at the 
development of modern information societies mainly in the 
sense of a knowledge society. We see no reasons to build artiﬁ cial 
divisions between these two perspectives, which could rather be 
seen as complementary (which was also how Manuel Castells 
approached the topic in his Information Age trilogy). However, if 
we have to choose whether we want to analyse the transformation 
of modern societies either in terms of particular technologies or 
in terms of their increasing knowledge intensity, our choice is 
deﬁ nitely in favour of the latter approach.
Knowledge for what?
Benjamin Franklin wrote to his friend in 1780 that the rapid 
progress of science ‘occasions my regretting sometimes that 
I was born too soon. It is impossible to imagine the height to 
which may be carried, in a thousand years, the power of man 
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over matter. We may perhaps learn to deprive large masses of 
their gravity, and give them absolute levity, for the sake of easy 
transport. Agriculture may diminish its labor and double its 
produce; all diseases may by sure means be prevented or cured, 
not excepting even that of old age, and our lives lengthened at 
pleasure even beyond the antediluvian standard. O that moral 
science were in as fair a way of improvement, that men would 
cease to be wolves to one another, and that human beings would 
at length learn what they now improperly call humanity’ (letter 
to Joseph Priestley, February 8, cit. Wheen 2004, 1).
Today we can see that many of the scientiﬁ c achievements 
envisioned by Franklin have come true in a much shorter period 
of time than the thousand years he thought would be needed. We 
do have magnetic levitation trains in operation, highly productive 
agricultural brands have been developed, and modern medicine is 
nowadays able to oﬀ er eﬀ ective medication for most diseases. At 
the same time, we can see that modern societies have not been 
able to achieve progress wished by Franklin within the social 
dimension. Economic growth is nowadays proceeding in a very 
unequal manner, and most of the riches produced are consumed 
by a small minority of the world’s population. Hundreds of 
millions are living in extreme poverty and many kinds of tensions 
and conﬂ icts are dividing diﬀ erent groups of people. Man’s power 
over matter is used not only in order to fulﬁ l the most essential 
human needs, but also to develop terrible weapons of mass 
destruction, and it is used in increasingly imaginative ways to 
feed man’s own narcissism. Th e development of modern human 
civilisation has seriously disturbed the earth’s ecological system, 
and enormous damages will probably be caused by the warming 
of the atmosphere in the relatively near future.
Th us, it is fairly easy to say that modern knowledge 
societies have developed in a very unbalanced manner. We 
have not learned to manage modern societies as eﬀ ectively as 
640
VII Future Directions
Antti Kasvio
we have learned to control natural processes. Th is is one of the 
main reasons why many people are nowadays rather sceptical 
concerning the very future of our civilisation. In today’s 
conditions we cannot put the blame upon the state of ‘moral 
science’ as straightforwardly as Benjamin Franklin did during 
the high time of the Enlightenment. But it is easy to agree with 
Manuel Castells when he stresses that, in analysing the increasing 
information and knowledge processing capacities of modern 
societies, social scientists should pay due attention to the social 
purposes these forces are put to serve. We should not pretend to 
be living in an advanced information or knowledge society – or in 
a network society – if that society is not clearly aware of the real 
societal and cultural consequences of its doings and if the society 
is not able to make ethically sound and defensible choices from 
the point of view of today’s human and ecological development. 
Helping modern societies move in this direction is the worthiest 
mission that can be presented to theories of information or 
network society – and this mission remains the same without 
regard to the particular terminologies used by the researchers.
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